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LABOR LAw-HoT CARGO CLAUSES No DEFENSE TO SECONDARY BoYcorrs-

In August 1954 the Sand Door 8c Plywood Company sold a general contractor, through a millwork contractor, certain non-union-made Paine
Lumber Company doors. The union notified its members at the construe-
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tion site that the doors should not be hung because of the "hot cargo"
· clause in their union contract.1 After negotiations between Sand Door and
the union failed, S_and Door filed charges alleging secondary boycott action
by the union in violation of section 8(b)(4)(A) of ·the amended National
Labor Relations Act.2 A Board order was issued3 and enforced by the court
of appeals.4 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed,
three justices dissenting. Petitioners violated section 8(b)(4)(A) by encouraging their employees to refuse to handle the Paine doors in order
to force the general contractor, millwork contractor, and Sand Door to
cease doing business with Paine. The "hot cargo" clause is no defense to
the violation. Carpenters Union (Sand Door and Plywood Co.) v. NLRB,
357 U.S. 93 (1958).5
"Hot cargo" provisions are inserted in labor contracts to permit employees of a neutral employer to refuse to handle the goods of any other
employer who may be engaged in a labor controversy. Prior to this decision at least three views concerning the legality of such provisions as a
defense to a charged violation of section 8(b)(4)(A) were expressed. The
first view is that a "hot cargo" clause should be a valid defense. This
was the view of both the Second Circuit and the District of Columbia
Circuit.6 The strongest justification for this result is that the union is not
"forcing or requiring'' the neutral employer to cease doing business with
the primary employer within the meaning of section 8 (b) (4) (A) since the
employer by contract voluntarily agreed to such union action.7 A further,
though weaker, argument in support of this view is that the employees
are not required to handle hot cargo by contract; thus their acts are not

1 The clause reads "workmen shall not be required to handle non-union material."
Principal case at 95.
2 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(b)(4)(A): "(b) It shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its- agent . • . (4) to engage in, or to induce or
encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted r~fusal
in the course of their employment to use, n;ianufacture, process, transport, or otherwise
handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any
services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring .•• any employer or other
person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products
of any other produ~er, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any
other person. . . •
a Carpenters Union (Sand Door & Plywood Co.), 113 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1955).
4 NLRB v. Local 1976, Carpenters Union, (9th Cir. 1957) 241 F. (2d) 147.
5 General Drivers Union (American Iron & Machine Works), 115 N.L.R.B. 800 (1956),
affd. in part sub nom. General Drivers Union v. NLRB, (D.C. Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d) 71,
was also decided at this time (Nos. 273 & 324).
6This view originated in Rabouin d.b.a. Conway's Express, 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949),
enforced sub nom. Rabouin v. NLRB, (2d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 906. It was recently
reaffirmed in Milk Drivers v. NLRB, (2d Cir. 1957) 245 F. (2d) 817, revd. 357 U.S. 345
(1958); General Drivers Union v. NLRB, (D.C. Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d) 71, cert. granted 355
U.S. 808 (1957), and is currently followed by Member Murdock of the NLRB [dissent in
McAllister Transfer Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 at 1790 (1954)).
7 Rabouin d.b.a. Conway's Express, note 6 supra.
·
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a "strike or concerted refusal" to work as required by the statute for an
unlawful secondary boycott.8 At the other extreme is the second view, that
"hot cargo" clauses are inherently invalid9 and therefore cannot be used as
a defense against a charged violation of section 8(b)(4)(A). This position
is based on the reasoning that Congress did not intend to allow private
contracts to nullify statutory rights created to protect the public and the
primary employer.10 Section 7 rights generally cannot be contracted away11
and when Congress meant section 8 rights to be subject to contractual
modification, it specifically declared this as in section 8(a)(3).12 Moreover,
section IO(a) provides that the power of the board to prevent unfair labor
practices "shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement or otherwise."
The third view regarding the validity of "hot cargo" clauses represents
a compromise approach which attempts to reconcile the language of
section 8(b)(4)(A) with the legislative intent underlying this provision.
This position, which is the holding of the principal case, is that "hot
cargo" clauses cannot be used as a defense to a charged violation of section 8(b)(4)(A), although voluntary observance of a "hot cargo" clause

s Rabouin d.b.a. Conway's Express, note 6 supra. Another rationale is that a unioninduced refusal of secondary employees to handle the primary employer's goods is not
a refusal "in the course of employment," because the "hot cargo" clause removes the
handling of such goods from the course of employment. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953). This was expressly repudiated in Carpenters Union, note 4 supra.
It is also possible to argue that there can be no "inducement or encouragement" of the
employees of the secondary employer when the union simply informs its members of their
rights under the "hot cargo" clause. Truck Drivers Union (Genuine Parts Co.), 119
N.L.R.B. No. 53, 41 L.R.R.M. 1087 (1957); General Drivers Union, note 5 supra.
9 This is the view followed in the dissenting opinion of Judge Prettyman, General
Drivers Union v. NLRB, note 6 supra, and in a concurring opinion of Judge Lumbard, Doud v. Milk Drivers Union, (2d Cir. 1957) 248 F. (2d) 534 at 538, as well as the
concurring opinion by Member Rodgers in General Drivers Union, note 5 supra.
10 Even though there is no mention of "hot cargo" clauses, it is clear Congress meant
to bar all secondary boycotts. Senator Taft declared during the legislative debates,
" •.. under the provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act, it became impossible to stop
a secondary boycott. • • • All this provision of the bill does is to reverse the effect of
the law as to secondary boycotts. . . . We have so broadened the provision dealing with
secondary boycotts as to make them an unfair labor practice." 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, 1104-1109 at 1106 (1948). It seems that
because pf the wording in §8(b)(4)(A) voluntary secondary boycotts are allowed but
this is probably due to the importance of the individual's freedom of choice in this area.
For explanation of freedom of choice, see note 19 infra.
llNational Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940). However, non-strike clauses
are valid as the right to strike has always been limited in this manner. NLRB v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Co., (7th Cir. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 948. The National Labor
Relations Act, 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §163 shows that §157 was not intended
to affect no-strike clauses. See 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, 434, 563 (1948).
12 "Nothing in this subchapter • • • shall preclude an employer from making an
agreement with a labor organization ••• to require as a condition of employment•.••"
61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(a)(3).
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would not be a violation of the statute.13 This approach results in the
recognition of a "hot cargo" contract which the neutral employer can
apparently breach at will, although the union is left with no remedy.14
Moreover, this treatment of the clause might seemingly permit a strike for
its inclusion in a collective bargaining agreement but prohibit use of the
clause by the union to induce its members not to handle the "hot cargo." 15
Even though this position may be open to question, it would have been
difficult for the Court to adopt either of the other views in light of the
current statutory language.
A holding that "hot cargo" clauses are a valid defense, as urged by the
dissent in the instant case, would have ignored the legislative history of
section 8(b)(4)(A)16 and allowed the secondary employer to waive a right
belonging to the public and the _primary employer.17 The main rationale
supporting a holding of validity, that the employer had agreed voluntarily
to the union action, was attacked by the majority as being unrealistic.18
This attack was based primarily upon consideration of the nature of the
collective bargaining process19 and the coercive power of a large union,20
despite the dissent's claim that the reasons for inclusion of a "hot cargo"
clause in the union contract can only be surmised.21 Upholding the clause
as a valid defense would also have served to put a common carrier in the
unenviable position of being liable for damages22 whenever it would be

13 This view originated in a concurring opm1on in McAllister Transfer Co., ll0
N.L.R.B. 1769 (1954). It was also applied in the Carpenters Union cases, notes 3 and 4
supra. Cf. NLRB v. Local II, United Brotherhood of Carpenters &: Joiners, (6th Cir.
1957) 242 F. (2d) 932.
14 Damages will probably not ,be awarded to the union as this would be indirect
coercion of the employer. Cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 at 254 (1953). A remedy
of self-help would violate National Labor Relations Act, note 2 supra.
15 One possible reason for holding the clause valid but unenforceable is the protection afforded employees from being fired for refusing to work. Douds v. Milk Dairy and
Drivers, (D.C. N.J. 1955) 133 F. Supp. 336.
16 Note 10 supra.
17 Majority opinion in McAllister Transfer Co., note 13 supra. See 2 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Ac:r, 1947, 1056 (1948); Preamble to the
LMRA, note 2 supra, "to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce." Another interesting attack on this view can be found in
Lawless, " 'Hot Cargo' Clauses: A Problem in Their Application to Secondary Boycotts,"
15 FED. B. J. 76 (1955).
18 Principal case at 106.
19 The Court felt that the provision may have been gained by strike or threat of
strike or merely as an abstract principle which is not the kind of freedom of choice
contemplated by §8(b)(4)(A). The section contemplated "a freedom of choice at the
time the question whether to boycott or not arises in a concrete situation .••." Principal
case at 105.
20 42 MINN. L. REV. 502 (1958).
21 Principal case at 113.
22 Galveston Truck Line v. Ada Motor Lines, 42 L.R.R.M. 2662 (1958). The court
expressly refused to rule on the validity of "hot cargo" clauses but nonetheless found
the common carrier liable for breach of its duty to transport goods.
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forced to breach its common law23 and statutory24 duty to provide transportation to the public upon reasonable request. On the other hand, in
order to hold the clause totally invalid it would have been necessary for
the Court to indulge in some questionable interpretation of the statutory
language.25 Of the three available approaches the one holding these clauses
totally invalid is nevertheless most consistent with the LMRA as a whole,
the legislative policy behind section 8(b)(4)(A), and current legal theory.
As indicated, the Court in the principal case was unable to find invalidity
in the language of the statute. An amendment to section 8(b)(4)(A) making
"hot cargo" clauses invalid would thus definitely settle the status of such
clauses in conformity with the true legislative intent.26

Joel D. Tauber, S.Ed.

2s Aldrich v. Southern Ry. Co., 95 S.C. 427, 79 S.E. 316 (1913).
24 24

Stat. 380 (1887), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §§1(4), 3(1); 49 Stat. 558 (1935), 49 U.S.C.
(1952) §316(b), (d).
25 The statute prohibits secondary boycotts only where the union uses a certain
method, "strike or concerted refusal," with a certain objective, "forcing or requiring" the
secondary employer to cease doing business with the primary employer and does not,
if narrowly interpreted, contemplate the situation created by "hot cargo" clauses.
26 See suggested changes by President Eisenhower in his labor message to the second
session of the 85th Congress, 104 CONG. REc. 646 Gan. 23, 1958); Tower, "Secondary
Boycotts, and the Taft-Hartley Act: Some Suggestions for Amendment," 21 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 547 (1953). However, Congress has twice previously refused to prohibit "hot cargo"
clauses, S. 3842, 84th Cong., 2d sess., §(a)(4) (1956); S. 2989, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954).

